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1. INTRODUCTION 
The sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury .... " In applying the sixth amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury, 
the Supreme Court has frequently affirmed the concept that ajury must be drawn from a 
fair and representative cross section of the community.! 
The circumstances in which the question of what constitutes a representative jury 
have varied greatly over the years. For example, in a long sequence of cases, the Supreme 
Court has faced such questions as whether the sixth amendment permits the exclusion of 
blacks, i women,3 and conscientious objectors 4 from jury panels; whether jury verdicts of 
guilty could be less than unanimous; 5 and whether juries could consist of groups smaller 
than the traditional twelve. 6 Although the answers to these questions have varied, the 
focal point of each analysis has been whether the practice in question deprived the 
defendant of the possibility of a jury that represented a cross section of the community. 
The concept of a representative jury does not mean that petit juries actually chosen 
must mirror the community or reflect the various distinctive groups in the population. 
The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana 7 did not hold that the defendant was guaran-
teed a jury of a particular composition, but rather that he was entitled to a venire from 
which distinctive groups had not been systematically excluded. 8 What is clear from the 
Supreme Court cases, however, is that whatever the nature of the state statute or practice 
may be,9 the state is not permitted by the sixth amendment to unreasonably restrict the 
1 See infra note 66. 
2 See, e.g., Peters v. Kill, 407 U.S. 493 (l972). 
3 See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (l979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); 
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (l946). 
4 See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
5 See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (l972). 
6 See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (l978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (l970). 
7419 U.S. 522,538 (l974). 
8 Id. at 538. 
9 That is, state statutes concerning jury selection (e.g., granting exemptions from jury service, 
adjusting the size of the petit jury, or defining "cause" to challenge) or departing from the traditional 
requirement of unanimity. 
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possibility that the petit jury will comprise a fair cross section of the community. 10 
This constitutional principle is the backbone of our jury system. The importance of a 
jury which represents a cross section of the community has been addressed by the 
Supreme Court in Taylor: 
We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the requirement 
has solid foundation. The purpose of ajury is to guard against the exercise of 
arbitrary power - to make available the common sense judgment of the 
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in 
preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response 
of a judge. This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made 
up of only special segments of the populace or if large distinctive groups are 
excluded from the pool. Community particip?tion in the administration of 
the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic herit-
age but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal 
justice system. Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding 
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be 
squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial. 11 
This article will discuss how the absence of such a principle would undermine the very 
foundation of the jury system by subjecting juries to the prejudices and abuses of officials 
who wish to oppress unpopular or inarticulate minorities. The completely discretionary 
use of peremptory challenges l2 comes dangerously close to achieving this undesireable 
end. Thus, this article will discuss how the state courts have maneuvered to rectify the 
problems resulting from the use of peremptory challenge as allowed by the Supreme 
Court. 
II. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES: HISTORICAL PURPOSE AND THE CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL 
STANDARD 
There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires Congress or 
the states to grant peremptory challenges. 13 A peremptory challenge is a right conferred 
solely by statute in all states and by rule in the federal courtS. 14 
At one point in the development of the common law, 15 only defendants were entitled 
to peremptory challenges as protection against jurors who might be prejudiced against 
them. 16 Later, in recognition of the government's interest in trial by a jury not unfa;irly 
10 Illinois v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1036-37 (1982). 
11 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. 
12 A peremptory challenge is "[t]he right to challenge ajuror without assigning a reason for the 
challenge. In most jurisdictions each party to an action, both civil and criminal, has a specified 
number of such challenges and after using all his peremptory challenges he is required to furnish a 
reason for subsequent challenges." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979). 
13 Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). 
14 FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(c). 
15 Peremptory challenges have been traced as far back as The Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw. 1, 
Stat. 4 (1305). 
16 See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (1807), in which it is noted that use of the 
peremptory challenge also allowed the defendant to remove a juror whom he had offended by an 
incisive voir dire or by an unsuccessful challenge for cause. Use of peremptory challenges in such 
cases, therefore, safeguards the vigorous exercise of these rights. 
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biased in favor of acquittal, the right of the prosecution to exercise peremptory challenges 
was established. 17 
Traditionally, the scope of the peremptory challenge has exceeded that of the 
challenge for cause. 18 Great latitude is allowed in the use of peremptory challenges: "The 
essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason 
stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's control." 19 The legitimate 
and significant role of the peremptory challenge lies "[i]n fashioning a balance between 
the 'goal of diffused impartiality in the petit jury and the limitations inherent in a feasible 
and fair process of jury selection .... "20 Toward the end of "eliminate[ing] extremes of 
partiality on both sides," and of assuring the parties "that the jurors before whom they try 
the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise," 
peremptory challenges may be used to eliminate prospective jurors whose unique rela-
tionship to the particular case raises the spectre of individual bias but who cannot be 
removed by a valid challenge for cause. 21 Both parties retain wide discretion to exercise 
peremptory challenges in this manner. 22 By definition, no reason need be given when 
exercising a peremptory challenge and there is no supervision by court or judge. 
Properly utilized, peremptory challenges should seek to eliminate an identified bias 
relating to the particular case on trial or the parties or witnesses thereto. The goal is to 
promote the impartiality of the jury without destroying its representativeness. 23 
In contrast, when a party peremptorily strikes all persons belonging to one group 
solely because they are members of an identifiable group, he not only disrupts the 
demographic balance of the venire but also frustrates the primary purpose of the rep-
resentative cross section requirement. The purpose of such a requirement is to achieve 
overall impartiality by encouraging the interaction of the diverse beliefs, values, and 
experiences of the jurors. 24 
Under ideal conditions,25 the prosecution and defense would be able to voir dire a 
final panel of jurors containing a significant number of nonwhite citizens. Assuming all 
challenges for cause are racially neutral, either party may destroy the possibility of a 
representative jury by the exercise of peremptory challenges. 26 Prosecutorial exercise of 
the government's peremptory challenges against nonwhite potential jurors often results 
in the empanelment of an all-white jury to determine the guilt or innocence of criminal 
defendants who are black or of another racial minorityY Unchecked, this practice 
17 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887). 
18 A challenge for cause is "[a] request from a party to a judge that a certain prospective juror 
not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified causes or reasons." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 209 (5th ed. 1979). 
19 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. 
20 Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979). 
21Id. at 514 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 219). 
22 In practice, a party will also use a peremptory challenge when he believes that the juror he 
removes may be consciously or unconsciously biased against him, or that his successor may be less 
biased. 
23 Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 514. 
24 People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (Cal. 1978). 
'5 Id. at 761. 
'6 Realistically, the American jury selection process is far from racially neutral, as indicated by 
the massive amount of litigation by black defendants who have been indicted or convicted by 
all-white grand or petit juries. 
27 See Comment, The Prosecutor's Exercise of the Peremptory Challen'2e to 'Exclude Nonwhite Jurors: A 
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effectively erodes decades oflegislation and Supreme Court decisions requiring represen-
tative juries. 
The use of peremptory challenges, however, has been upheld as above suspicion and 
beyond the control of the court. In the landmark case of Swain v. Alabama ,28 the Supreme 
Court established that purposeful discrimination must be proven, not assumed or merely 
asserted. Swain is the only United States Supreme Court decision thus far to directly 
address the constitutional validity of the use of peremptory challenges to discriminate on 
the basis of race. Although intensely criticized,29 Swain has led most courts to reject all 
constitutional challenges to the prosecutor's alleged discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges. 
Swain was a black defendant convicted by an all-white jury of the rape of a white 
woman. Of eight blacks on the venire, two were exempt and six were peremptorily struck 
by the prosecutor. Swain contended that the prosecution'S use of its peremptory chal-
lenges constituted invidious discrimination in the selection of jurors. 30 The Supreme 
Court disagreed. The basis of the Supreme Court's holding was that the petitioner had 
failed to carry the burden of proof that there had been systematic exclusion of blacks on 
the petit jury. 31 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that it had been 
established that no black had served on a petit jury in the county since 1950. 32 
Based on the Swain decision, the burden is especially heavy on the appellant since the 
reviewing court examines the records on the assumption that the trier of fact, who heard 
the witnesses and observed their demeanor on the stand, had a better opportunity thim 
the reviewing court to reach a correct conclusion as to the existence of discrimination. 33 
Therefore, the court, in a particular case, will accept the conclusion of the trier on 
disputed issues unless the evidence is overwhelming enough to be fundamentally unfair, 
i.e., in violation of due process or equal protection. It is essential, therefore, to prove that 
a review of peremptory challenges is necessary before the harm is done 34 and before the 
defendant's chance to prove that he was tried by a jury which is not representative of the 
community of which he is a member is extinguished. 
III. OVERCOMING THE SWAIN BURDEN 
One logical route to tackling the Swain standard is to concentrate on the defendant's 
burden of proof that the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of every nonwhite on the 
defendant's final panel is part of a past pattern of systematic exclusion of nonwhites from 
juries. Since Swain, defendants have objected frequently to prosecutorial employment of 
peremptory challenges to obtain all-white petit juries, but the Supreme Court's "system-
Valued Common Law Privilege in Conflict with the Equal Protection Clause, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 554,557 
(1977). 
28 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
29 Although this article addresses this issue from the minority defendants' perspective, particu-
larly the black defendants, standing to sue rests with all criminal defendants who challenge that they 
were denied a jury fairly representative of the community. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). 
30 See infra note 32. 
31 Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04. 
32 [d. at 231-32. 
33 For example, the Soares court relied on the fact that trial judges have extensive experience 
with jury empanelment, have knowledge of local conditions, and are familiar with attorneys on both 
sides. 387 N.E.2d at 517. 
34 That is, before the minority defendant is tried by a jury which is not composed of a fair cross 
section of the community. 
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atic exclusion" test has remained insurmountable in all cases. 35 While racial prejudice has 
been attacked at each step in the jury selection process, the final step - the exercise of 
peremptory challenges - has traditionally been unassailable. 36 
The systematic exclusion standard has been a formidable hurdle for three principal 
reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Swain held that the "mere absence of blacks on juries 
over an extended period of time does not establish systematic exclusion" if the defendant 
cannot show that the state was solely responsible for that result. Second, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that peremptory challenges are used only to obtain a fair and 
impartial jury. Finally, the Swain decision never fully delineated the elements necessary to 
show a pattern of systematic exclusion. 37 
The Supreme Court in Swain did, however, indicate that a pattern may exist when 
"no Negroes ever sit on petit juries" as a result of the prosecution's peremptory chal-
lenges. 38 Such a standard means that if one or two token jurors have been seated on a jury, 
then systematic exclusion cannot be proven. 
A defendant who is the victim of a consistent prosecutorial policy of total exclusion of 
blacks through the use of perem ptory challenges would find it extremely difficult to prove 
his case under the standard set forth in Swain. Not the least of the impediments to 
establish such a claim is the nature of the proof required to establish systematic exclusion 
by the prosecutor. The defendant is placed in a difficult position if he is tried before an 
extended pattern of abuse becomes apparent. 39 Most defendants, especially blacks and 
other minorities, are either indigent or have limited financial means and thus are unable 
to afford investigators to gather the necessary data. 40 Furthermore, many jurisdictions do 
not maintain comprehensive records of peremptory challenges, let alone information 
regarding the race of those individuals challenged. 41 
It has only been since Swain that some attempt at record-keeping has been instituted, 
although doubt still remains as to how prevalent and accurate such records are. For 
example, in People v. Wheeler,4~ the court found the record unclear as to the exact number 
of blacks struck from the jury by the prosecutor; veniremen 43 are not required to 
announce for the record their race, religion, or ethnic origin when they enter the box, 
and these matters are not ordinarily explored on voir dire. 44 
Fortunately, in instances where records of such challenges and exclusions began to be 
35 Comment, supra note 27, at 554. 
36 [d. 
37 The Swain court merely implied that it would entertain an equal protection challenge in 
instances where, for example, the prosecutor, in case after case, whatever the circumstances and 
whatever the crime, and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, removes blacks who have been 
selected as qualified jurors and who have survived challenges for cause, and where the result is that 
no blacks ever serve on petit juries. 380 U.S. at 223. 
38 Swain, 380 U.S. at 223. In so stating, the Swain court ignored the Supreme Court's former 
holding in Patton v. Michigan, 332 U.S. 463, 466 (1948), requiring a state to justify why no blacks 
actually had served on juries for an extended period of time. 
39 Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 511 n.17; Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 767. 
40 Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 768. 
41 [d. at 768. 
42 583 P.2d at 748. 
43 A venireman refers to "[a] member of a panel of jurors .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1395 
(5th ed. 1979). 
44 The reason given, of course, is that the courts are, or should be, blind to all such distinctions 
among its citizens. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 752. 
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kept after Swain, courts have become alert to possible discriminatory practices and began 
warning prosecutors that they were approaching systematic exclusion of nonwhites. 45 
IV. THE STATE COURT'S REJECTION OF SWAIN AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW 
STANDARDS 
In light of the near impossibility experienced by defendants in attempting to meet 
the requirements set by Swain, a small number of state courts46 have fashioned standards 
based on their state constitutions to guarantee the defendant a trial before a jury that has 
not had cognizable groups eliminated by the discriminatory acts of the prosecutorY As a 
result, these courts have fashioned new approaches to the peremptory challenge issue. 
These approaches can provide the Supreme Court the means with which to reevaluate the 
present status of fair representation in light of the current use of the peremptory 
challenge. 
A. The Application of State Constitutions to Peremptory Challenges 
In Commonwealth v. Soares, 48 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts followed an 
alternative basis for examination of the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to 
exclude twelve of thirteen black jurors. The court looked to its own state constitution and 
noted that the protections offered by the right to trial before a jury of one's peers is 
guaranteed by Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. 
Article 12 states in pertinent part: "And no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, de-
spoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection 
of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his 
peers, or the law of the land."49 
Citing the extensive criticism of Swain, 50 and recognizing that Swain offers negligible 
protection to a defendant asserting the right to trial by a jury of his peers,51 the court took 
the opportunity to depart from applying its rule perfunctorily. The court was therefore 
giving serious attention to the defendant's suggestion that consideration of the discrim-
inatory use of peremptory challenges should not begin and end with Swain. 
Beginning with the mandate that ajury be drawn from a fair and representative cross 
45 United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40, 43 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 
1207, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1971). 
46 For example, Massachusetts, California, Illinois. 
47 In most instances, the state court was influenced by the fact that at the time Swain was decided, 
the Supreme Court had not yet ruled that the guarantee of the sixth amendment of a trial by an 
impartial jury was binding on the states through incorporation into the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. It was in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), decided three years 
after Swain, that the Supreme Court stated that, "[b]ecause we believe that trial by jury in criminal 
cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which - were they to be tried in a federal court-
would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee." 
48 387 N.E.2d at 499. 
49 [d. at 510. 
50 See, e.g., Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant and His Peerless 
Jury, 4 Hous. L. REV. 448 (1966); Soja, Recent Development, Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 41 
ALB. L. REV. 623 (1977); Comment, A Case Study cifthe Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal 
Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. LOUIS U.L.]. 662 (1974). 
51 Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 510 n.12. 
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section of the community, 52 the Soares court held that the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude members of discrete groups, solely on the basis of bias presumed to 
derive from that individual's membership in the group, contravenes the requirement 
inherent in Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights and cannot be tolerated. 53 In effectuat-
ing the guarantee, the court recognized the presumption that peremptory challenges 
would be used properly. That presumption, however, was held rebuttable by either party 
on a showing that: (1) a pattern of conduct has developed whereby several prospective 
jurors who have been challenged peremptorily are members of a discrete group; and (2) 
there is a likelihood that they are being excluded from the jury solely by reason of their 
group membership.54 
In Soares, the court found a clear pattern of conduct in which twelve of thirteen 
eligible blacks were challenged by the prosecutor. The disproportionate exclusion by the 
prosecution of ninety-two percent of the prospective black jurors, as contrasted with 
thirty-four percent of the available whites, was sufficient indication of the likelihood that 
blacks were being challenged because they were black. 55 The court also recognized other 
factors to be considered by the trial judge when assessing whether the presumption of 
propriety has been rebutted; e.g., common group membership of a defendant and those 
jurors excluded, and the lack of common group membership of the victim and the 
majority of remaining jurors. 56 In Soares, the defendants and the disproportionately 
excluded jurors were black; the victim and the seated jurors, with the exception of one, 
were white. 
Presented with such evidence, the trial judge must determine whether it is reasonable 
to draw the inference that peremptory challenges have been exercised so as to deliber-
ately exclude individuals on account of their group affiliation. Allowing for the difficulty 
of making such a judgment, the Soares court was nevertheless convinced that trial judges, 
given their extensive experience with jury empanelment, their knowledge of local condi-
tions, and their familiarity with the attorneys on both sides, will address these questions 
with the requisite sensitivity."7 
Once the judge determines that the presumption has been rebutted, the burden 
shifts to the alleged offender to demonstrate, if possible, that members of the dispropor-
tionately excluded group were not struck on account of their group affiliation. It is in this I 
respect that the Soares court most markedly departs from the Swain standard. While the 
Swain court placed the burden exclusively on the complaining defendant to prove system-
atic exclusion, a burden that has often proved to be of Herculean proportions, the Soares 
court allocates part of the burden to the prosecuting attorney. If a reasonable inference 
can be drawn that peremptory challenges have been exercised to exclude individuals on 
the basis of group affiliation - a much more reasonable and demonstrable standard -
the burden shifts to the allegedly offending party to justify his use of peremptory 
challenges. While it need not approximate the grounds required by a challenge for cause, 
the prosecutor's reason must pertain to the individual qualities of the prospective juror 
52 Id. at 511. The United States Supreme Court has frequently affirmed the concept that ajury 
must be drawn from a fair and representative cross section of the community. See infra notes 66 & 67. 
53 Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 516. 
54 Id. at 517. 
55Id. 
56 Although the Soares court noted that these factors are not a prerequisite to an assertion of the 
right herein defined, they are nevertheless significant. Id. 
57 See also Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034 (1982) and infra note 79. 
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and not to that juror's race or group affiliation. 58 Again, reliance is placed on the good 
judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptory chal-
lenges from "sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting facts of group discrimi-
nation."59 
The presumption of validity is rebutted if the court finds that the burden of justifica-
tion is not sustained as to any of the questioned peremptory challenges. In that event, the 
court must conclude that the jury as constituted fails to comply with the representative 
cross section requirement,60 and it must dismiss the jurors thus far selected and draw a 
different venire for the jury selection process to begin afresh. As the Soares court points 
out, some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be 
treated as harmless error. Article 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts 
Constitution calls for a probing scrutiny of trials conducted in the Commonwealth. 61 
In following this alternative route to relief, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts gave much credit to the California Supreme Court for their recent decision in People 
v. Wheeler 6t which broke away from the traditional Swain standard and laid the 
groundwork for other courts to use. In Wheeler, two black men were convicted of 
murdering a white store owner in the course of a robbery. Several blacks had been 
summoned to the jury box and had been found unimpeachable. However, the prosecutor 
eliminated each of them through his use of peremptory challenges, and was thereby able 
to obtain an all-white jury. The California high court reversed the convictions on the basis 
that the prosecution'S actions violated the right to an impartial jury representative of a 
cross section of the community, as guaranteed by the California Constitution. 
Article I, section 16, of the California Constitution provides that "[t]rial by jury is an 
inviolate right and shall be secured to all .... "63 It is well settled that in criminal cases, this 
provision includes the right to have a unanimous verdict rendered by impartial and 
unprejudiced jurors. 64 Although section 16 of Article I does not explicitly guarantee trial 
by an "impartial" jury, as does the sixth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the 
California court emphasized that the "right is no less implicitly guaranteed by our charter, 
as the courts have long recognized."65 
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that in a series of 
decisions beginning almost four decades ago,66 the United States Supreme Court has held 
that an essential prerequisite to an impartial jury is that it be drawn from "a representative 
cross section of the community."67 Especially relevant to the court's analysis was the 
5. Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 517. 
59Id. at 517-18 (citing Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 765). 
60 Of course, the right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the 
community does not mean that members of a group must be immune from peremptory challenges. 
Individual members may still be struck on grounds of specific bias. Nor does it mean that a party is 
entitled to a petit jury that proportionately represents every group in the community. All that a party 
is constitutionally entitled to is a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross section 
of the community as the process of random draw permits. 
61 Soares, 387 N.E.2d at 511 n.17. 
6~ 583 P.2d at 754. 
63 [d. at 754. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 The series of decisions is: Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Glasser v. United States, 315 
U.S. 60 (1942); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1945); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 
187 (1946); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
67 Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 755. For the history and theory of the representative cross section rule, 
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warning in Glasser v. United States 68 that "tendencies, no matter how slight, toward the 
selection of jurors by any method other than a process which will insure a trial by a 
representative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, 
and should be sturdily resisted."69 
The California Supreme Court in Wheeler stressed, however, that it was relying as 
much on the law of California as on federal case law. The court points out that it was not 
until the 1975 decision in Taylor v. Louisiana 70 that the United States Supreme Court 
imposed the representative cross section rule on the states as a fundamental component 
of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury incorporated in the fourteenth 
amendment. 71 California, on the other hand, had long since adopted that rule: "The 
court has repeatedly emphasized the need for compliance with the representative cross 
section rule as a precondition to trial by an impartialjury."7t 
The Wheeler court also held that in California the right to trial by a jury drawn from a 
representative cross section of the community is guaranteed equally and independently 
by the sixth amendment to the federal Constitution. In this respect, the California court 
diverges from the Swain court whose rationale was based on the fourteenth amendment. 
The Swain court held that peremptory challenge was an absolute right which did not 
violate the fourteenth amendment in the absence of a strong showing of systematic, 
continual exclusion. 73 The California court also diverged from Swain's holding that a 
peremptory challenge is an absolute right. While conceding that the statute 74 defines such 
a challenge as one for which "no reason need be given,"75 the California court pointed out 
that "it does not follow therefrom that it is an objection for which no reason need exist."76 
see Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedures (1977), ch. 3; Daughtrey, Cross-Sectionalism in jury-
Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. REV. 1; and Kuhn, jury Discrimination: The 
Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1968). 
68 315 U.S. 60 (1942). In this case, the defendants in a federal trial complained of the alleged 
exclusion of all women who were not members of the state League of Women Voters from petit jury 
service. Although the Court rejected the contention on the ground of insufficient proof, it did 
strongly reaffirm the requirements of a representative jury. It observed at the outset that impartiality 
achieved through representativeness is essential to preserving the constitutional right to jury trial. 
69 Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 756 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942)). 
10 419 U.S. 522,525 (1975). In Taylor, the Supreme Court considered a statute which provided 
that women must file with the clerk of the court a written declaration of their desire to serve in order 
to be selected for jury service. The result was that in the parish in which the petitioner was tried, 
although fifty three percent of those eligible for jurys ervice were women, no more than ten percent 
of the venire persons were women. The Court concluded that the provision violated the sixth 
amendment since it operated to exclude women from jury service and thus unduly restricted the 
possibility of a defendant"s having a petit jury that represented a fair cross section of the community. 
11 When the high court first declared the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury applicable 
to the states through the fourteenth amendment, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), it was 
silent on the present question. 
12 Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 758. 
13 Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. 
14 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069. 
15/d. 
16 Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 760. The court, however, was careful to limit the extent of such inquiry by 
emphasizing that peremptories are not open to examination unless and until a timely motion is 
made, the trial court is satisfied that there is a prima facie showing that jurors are being challenged 
on the sole ground of group bias, and even then, the prosecutor is not required to defend each and 
every challenge but only those he has exercised against members of the identifiable group. Finally, 
the court stressed that the issue in such an event is not his 'judgment" or "sincerity" but simply 
whether his ground of challenge was a specific bias on the part of the individual juror.· 583 P.2d at 
767 n.32. 
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In fashioning a remedy, the Wheeler court's solution was to delineate a burden of 
proof which a party may reasonably be expected to sustain in meritorious cases,77 but 
which cannot be abused to the detriment of the peremptory challenge system. Therefore, 
the Wheeler court relied on more traditional procedures which were supported by a 
substantial body of scholarly opinion. 78 
The Wheeler court requires a party to make timely objections if he believes his 
opponent is using his peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of race alone. 79 
He must make a prima facie case of such discrimination to the satisfaction of the court. 80 
The latter can be accomplished by making as complete a record of the circumstances as is 
feasible, by establishing that the excluded persons are members of a cognizable group 
within the meaning of the representative cross section rule,81 and by showing a strong 
likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association 
rather than because of any specific bias. 82 
The trial court must determine upon presentation of evidence whether a reasonable 
inference arises that peremptory challenges are being used on the ground of group bias 
alone. 83 If the court finds this to be the case, the burden shifts to the other party to show 
that the peremptory challenges in question were not predicated on group bias alone. At 
this point, the statutory provision that "no reason need be given" for a peremptory 
challenge 84 must give way to the constitutional imperative. Although the statute is not 
invalid on its face, it would be impermissible to allow it to insulate from inquiry a 
presumptive denial of the right to an impartial jury. 85 This right is paramount because the 
peremptory challenge is not a constitutional necessity but a statutory privilege. 86 If the 
court finds that the burden of justification is not sustained as to any of the questioned 
peremptory challenges, then the presumption of their validity is rebutted. A new jury 
selection process would therefore be granted to the defendant. 
The California court in Wheeler soundly rejected the prosecution'S contention that the 
court is "compelled to allow this pernicious practice to continue"87 because of Swain. The 
court's rationale in rejecting this contention was that "[b]ecause a fundamental safeguard 
of the California Declaration of Rights is at issue, 'our first reference is California Law' 
and divergent decisions of the United States Supreme Court are to be followed by 
77 The California court thus rejected the Swain requirement as too burdensome where a 
legitimate claim arises. 
78 The body of scholarly opinion includes Van Dyke, supra note 67, at 166-67; Kuhn, supra note 
67, at 293-95; Note, Limiting the Peremptory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L. 
J. 1715, 1738-41 (1977); Note, The Jury: A Reflection of the Prejudices of the Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 
1414, 1430-33 (1969). 
79 Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 764. 
80 Id. 
81 Blacks, of course, constitute one such group. 
82 For example, the party may show that the jurors in question share only the characteristic of 
membership in the group and that in all other respects, they are as heterogeneous as the community 
as a whole. 
83 The term "group bias" was used by the Wheeler court to refer to that condition where "a party 
presumes that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group 
distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds." 583 P.2d at 761. 
84 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069. 
8. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 765 n.28. 
86Id. at 765 n.28 (citing People v. King, 240 Cal. App. 2d 389 (1966)). 
87 Id. at 766. 
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California courts only when they provide no less protection than is guaranteed by 
California law."88 
Deciding that Swain afforded less protection to California residents than the rule it 
adopted, the California Supreme Court criticized Swain for its "impossible-to-meet stan-
dard."89 Noting that "it demeans the Constitution to declare a fundamental personal right 
under that charter and at the same time make it virtually impossible for an aggrieved 
citizen to exercise that right,"90 the Wheeler court ordered that Swain was not to be 
followed in the California courts and refused to follow the cases applying it. Rather, in 
California, all claims that peremptory challenges are being used to strike jurors solely on 
the ground of group bias are to be governed by Article I, section 16 of the California 
Constitution and the procedure outlined in Wheeler. 
B. Constitutional Limitations of the Use of Peremptory Challenges 
Another approach to the problem of the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges focuses on the fact that a peremptory challenge is a procedural right whereas a 
right to an impartial jury which represents a fair cross section of the community is a 
constitutional right. Commentators and several state courts have taken the position that 
the former must yield to fifth and fourteenth amendment rights. 91 
Recently, in Illinois v. Payne,92 the Illinois Appellate Court held that the right to 
peremptory challenges is not absolute when jurors are excluded merely because of race. 
The prosecutor's statutory right to exercise peremptory challenges without giving a 
reason, therefore, must yield to the paramount constitutional right of the accused to a 
jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 93 In this case, the prosecutor, over 
the accused's objections on voir dire, used six of eight peremptory challenges to exclude 
from the jury six of seven available blacks who were factually heterogeneous and shared 
no common characteristics other than race. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the 
trial court's failure to require the prosecutor to demonstrate that blacks were not being 
systematically excluded solely because of their race was reversible error. 94 
Initially, the Payne court addressed the often ignored fact that every criminal trial 
"involves the proper roles of the State, the prosecuting attorney and the court itself."95 It 
is usually overlooked that, in a criminal trial, it is the state that is the plaintiff throughout 
the entire proceeding. The Payne court took the position that if a state's attorney effec-
tively practices racial discrimination, the state itself is racially discriminating against the 
accused. The Payne court therefore defined the problem as whether the state itself can 
exclude blacks from serving as jurors solely because of their immutable characteristics. In 
answer the court found that such acts by the State are repugnant to the sixth amendment 
BB Jd. at 767. 
B9 Id. at 768. 
90 Id. 
91 See Kuhn, supra note 67, at 288; Geeslin, Peremptory Challenge - Systematic Exclusion of 
Prospective jurors on the Basis of Race, 39 MISS. L.J. 157,159 (1967). See also People v. Wheeler, 583 
P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); Illinois v. Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034 (1982). 
92 106 Ill. App. 3d 1034 (1982). 
93 U.S. CON ST. amend. VI; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 115-4(e) (1979). 
94 This was based on the court's finding that under these circumstances, the trial court should 
have realized that such exclusion was occurring. Therefore, the resulting conviction was reversed 
and a new trial ordered in which the accused would be accorded the constitutional right to be tried by 
a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. 
95 Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1035. 
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of the Constitution of the United States. The court further declared that the systematic 
exclusion of prospective jurors solely on the basis of their race is equally invidious and 
unconstitutional at any stage of the jury selection process. 96 To hold otherwise would be to 
render a nullity the constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the 
community through the use of peremptory challenges. 
The court also looked to the role of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case. The 
duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice and not merely to convict. 97 Thus, a prosecutor is 
not primarily seeking justice when he excludes blacks from the jury solely because they 
are blacks. He is merely seeking to convict. This action is a clear violation of professional 
duty which must be discouraged. 
In recognizing that the process of criminal trial involves the whole society, the court 
points out that when, by affirmative means, blacks are systematically excluded from 
serving on a petit jury, the harm is not restricted to the defendant. There is harm to the 
jury system, to the law as an institution, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the 
processes of our courtS. 98 Clearly, justice is not fulfilled if the trial court acquiesces in, 
condones, or fails to preclude attempts by the prosecuting attorney to exclude blacks from 
the jury solely because they are blacks. 
Therefore, the Illinois Appellate Court in Payne ordered that "when it reasonably 
appears to the trial court that the prosecuting attorney is systematically excluding blacks 
from the jury solely because they are blacks, any trial procedure which allows such racial 
discrimination must yield to the paramount constitutional demand of the sixth amend-
ment."99 In other words, the rule that no reason is needed for a peremptory challenge 
must give way to the constitutional imperative. The Payne court followed the Wheeler 
court's reasoning that the statute allowing peremptory challenges would be invalid if it 
were applied "to insulate from inquiry a presumptive denial of the right to an impartial 
jury." 100 
The rationale for the requirement that the constitutional demand must control lies in 
the indisputable fact that the State's peremptory challenge is a statutory procedure and 
not a constitutional necessity, 101 nor even a common law imperative. Even the Swain court 
had held that when a constitutional right conflicts with a statutory procedure, the con-
stitutional right must prevail. 102 Accordingly, if a reasonable inference of systematic 
exclusion is drawn, the prosecutor is required to demonstrate, by whatever facts and 
circumstances exist, that blacks were not being excluded from the jury solely because they 
were blacks. To the Payne court, the presumption that the Constitution was not being 
violated was no longer applicable once it reasonably appeared to the trial court that the 
accused was being affirmatively denied an impartial jury as required by the sixth amend-
ment. 
The Payne court put the burden squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution to 
demonstrate that the Constitution was not being violated. Unless the State could sustain 
its burden of demonstrating that it was not excluding blacks from the jury solely because 
96 That is, from the time the general jury list is prepared by the jury commissioner until the jury 
is actually selected and sworn. 
97 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1979). 
98 Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1038 (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. at 187). 
99 Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1039. 
100 See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 765 n.28. 
101 Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1039 (citing Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. at 586). 
102 Swain, 380 U.S. at 244 (Goldberg, j., dissenting). 
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they were black, 103 the jurors who had been already selected at the time the inference was 
drawn were to be dismissed as failing to comply with the fair cross section requirement of 
the Constitution. As in Soares and Wheeler, the defendant in Payne was granted a new 
venire for a new jury selection process. 
The state relied upon Swain to permit the use of peremptory challenges to exclude 
blacks. The Payne court rejected the state's defense of "this pernicious practice."lo4 
Instead, it relied on the Swain court's own language which stated that "[i]f it would appear 
that the purposes of the peremptory challenge are being perverted ... the presumption 
protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome."I05 The Swain court, indeed, had 
recognized that peremptory challenges could be controlled by the trial court if it ap-
peared to the court that they were being used to violate the constitutional rights of the 
accused. 
The Payne court further relied on Duncan v. Louisiana 106 and Taylor 107 which were 
decided after Swain. In Duncan, the sixth amendment of the Constitution as it related to 
jury trials was applied to state criminal trials. Seven years later, the Taylor court held that 
the fair cross section requirement was fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the 
sixth amendment. 108 
Deciding that Duncan and Taylor had significantly changed the law from the time 
Swain was decided that an accused therefore has the right not to have the state affirma-
tively frustrate his sixth amendment right, the Payne court applied the rationale of the 
Taylor court. 109 The Payne court recognized that systematic and affirmative racial exclu-
sion of available black jurors by the state which results in only one black being seated as a 
juror is no less evil and no less constitutionally prohibited than the same procedure which 
results in the total exclusion of blacks. The practice of seating a token black, after being 
assured that there are no more blacks available to be seated, does not lessen the uncon-
stitutionality of the State's initial exclusion of blacks from the jury solely on the basis of 
race. 
A recent Supreme Court decision has reaffirmed the superiority of the due process 
right to a fair trial over procedural considerations. In Peters v. Kif!, 110 the Supreme Court 
held that a white criminal defendant had standing to challenge the method used to select 
his grand or petit jury on the ground that it arbitrarily or discriminatorily excluded blacks 
from jury service. Even though such a holding was limited to the issue of standing, the 
court expressed considerable concern about the arbitrariness of modern jury selection 
procedures. While discussing the "potential impact" of such practices, the Supreme Court 
103 Again, it is noted that decisions of this nature are difficult, and faith is placed on the trial 
judges who, "given their presence in the courtroom during the entire proceeding and their ability to 
observe all facets of the voir dire selection, their experience with voir dire examinations, and the 
benefit of their judicial trial experience, should be able to distinguish bona fide reasons for exclusion 
from contrived declarations of motives. Moreover, if errors are made in this regard, they are subject 
to review as are other errors that occur during trial." Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1040 n.5. 
104 Id. at 1041. 
105 Swain, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965). 
106 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
107 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
108 The Taylor court itself relied on cases that arose after Swain. For example, the court discussed 
Carterv.Jury Commissioner, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), and noted that in Carter, "the Court observed that the 
exclusion of Negroes from jury service because of their race 'contravenes the very idea of a jury - "a 
body truly representative of the community.'" "[Citation]." Payne, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1042. 
109 Id. at 1042, 1043. 
110 407 U.S. 493 (1972). 
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implied in dictum a preference for preserving constitutional rights rather than pro-
cedural devices, such as the peremptory challenge. 111 The Court cited Strauder v. West 
Virginia 112 as authority for the fundamental principle that a jury must represent a fair 
cross section of the community in order to be consistent with due process of law. Quoting 
Hill v. Texas, 113 the Court also stressed that no state is at liberty to impose upon one 
charged with a crime, discrimination in its trial procedure which the Constitution for-
bids. 114 
V. CONCLUSION 
In May of 1983, the Supreme Court refused to hear three cases concerning 
peremptory challenges. 115 Denying certiorari, Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell 
noted that some states have restricted the use of these challenges and that other state 
courts are studying the matter. The Justices suggested that states be used as "laboratories" 
before the Supreme Court addresses the question again. 116 
The fact that the Supreme Court has decided to defer its decision on this issue to a 
later time bodes well for minority defendants. There is still time to prepare a convincing 
argument to the Court that peremptory challenges are easily subject to abuse by pro-
secutors for discriminatory purposes and that requiring proof of "systematic exclusion" of 
a minority group from the jury venire is an unreasonable standard. 
New approaches have been applied by state courts to lessen the discretionary aspect 
of peremptory challenges in order to meet the Constitutional requirement of a jury 
composed of a fair cross section of the community. The highest courts of Massachusetts 
and California have relied upon their own state constitutions by rationalizing that they 
afford greater protection than Swain. In all cases, the state courts have emphasized that 
the seating of one or two token minority jurors does not preclude the possibility of 
systematic: exclusion. They also realize that the Swain standard imposes an intolerable 
burden, resting exclusively on the accused, without clearly stating the guidelines neces-
sary to carry this burden sufficiently. Some courts have also acted under the rationale that 
procedural rights must yield to constitutional rights when a right of such magnitude -
the right to an impartial jury representative of a fair cross section of the community - is 
involved. 
Without the ability to impose restrictions on the exercise of peremptory challenges, 
there is no effective remedy for a continuing practice of systematic exclusion. 117 There-
fore, peremptory challenge, a nonconstitutional procedural tool, should be sacrificed 
where its exercise infringes upon rights found in both the sixth and fourteenth amend-
ments, especially since it is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution. 
111 Id. at 502-03. 
112 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
113 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942). 
114 Peters, 407 U.S. at 506. 
ChongMi Lah 
115 McCray v. New York, 57 N.Y.2d 542, 443 N.E.2d 915 (1982); Miller v. Illinois, 104 Ill. App. 
3d 1205,437 N.E.2d 945 (1982); and Perry v. Louisiana, 420 SO.,2d 139 (La. 1982), cert. denied, 461 
U.S. 961 (1983). Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell joined, stated that 
he "believe[d] that further consideration of the substantive and procedural ramifications of the 
problem by other courts will enable us to deal with the issue more wisely at a later date." 461 U.S. at 
962. 
116 Silas, A Jury of One's Peers, A.B.A.]., November, 1983, at 1607, 1608. 
117 Comment, supra note 27, at 568. 
